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Abstract 
The present experiment investigated whether increased media exposure could lead 
to an increase in memory distortions regarding a traumatic public event: the explosion of 
the No.30 bus in Tavistock Square, London on the 7th July 2005.  One hundred and fifty 
Swedish and one hundred and fifty UK participants completed a series of questionnaires 
about their memory of either (i) the aftermath of the explosion, (ii) a non-existent 
computerised reconstruction of the moment of the explosion or (iii) non-existent Closed 
Circuit Television footage of the moment of the explosion.  In line with the availability 
heuristic, UK participants were more likely than Swedish participants to claim to have 
seen all three types of footage.  Furthermore, a sub-sample of UK participants who 
appeared to have developed false ‘memories’ of seeing the No.30 bus explode scored 
significantly higher on measures of dissociation and fantasy proneness than participants 
who did not develop false ‘memories.’  This experiment provides further support for the 
role of imaginative processes in the development of false memories.   
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Introduction 
Several studies have now shown that repeated suggestive interviews about 
parentally-provided false childhood events leads a proportion of participants to claim that 
they actually remember experiencing such events (Loftus & Pickrell, 1995; Porter, Yuille 
& Lehman, 1999; Wade, Garry, Read & Lindsay, 2002). There is also evidence that 
asking participants to imagine non-events can change their subjective belief that such 
events actually occurred (Garry, Manning, Loftus & Sherman, 1996; Mazzoni & Memon, 
2003; but see Pezdek, Blandon-Gitlin & Gabbay, 2006).   
Hyman and Kleinknecht (1999) and Hyman and Loftus (1997) have proposed a 
three stage model to explain how individuals might come to report that they remember 
events that did not occur.  Firstly, the person must believe that the event is plausible.  
Secondly, they must believe that they were likely to have experienced the event (see 
Scoboria, Mazzoni, Kirsch & Reylea, 2004).  Thirdly they must make a source 
monitoring error and misattribute the constructed memory as being a personal memory.  
Although there are important debates over terminology and the generalisability of 
findings (see DePrince, Allard, Oh & Freyd, 2004; Pezdek & Lam, 2007; Wade et al., 
2007; see also Smeets et al., 2005) the convergent evidence suggests that a proportion of 
individuals will come to report that they remember witnessing events that they did not 
experience, or will incorporate substantial amounts of incorrect detail into their memory 
reports.    
A recent line of research which complements the above studies has shown that 
people can be misled to report that they remember central details of recent, public events 
that they could not possibly have witnessed.  This so-called ‘crashing memories’ method, 
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typically asks participants to state whether they have seen (non-existent) video footage of 
highly charged public events, for example, an airplane crash in Amsterdam (Crombag, 
Wagenaar & van Koppen, 1996) or the car crash in which Diana, Princess of Wales, Dodi 
Al-Fayed, and their driver were killed (Ost, Vrij, Costall & Bull, 2002; see also Granhag, 
Strömwall & Billings, 2003; Jelicic et al., 2006b; Ost, Hogbin & Granhag, 2006; Wilson 
& French, 2006; Smeets et al., 2006).   
The crashing memory effect appears to be robust with between 36% and 66% of 
participants in any given study claiming to have seen the non-existent video footage 
(Wilson & French, 2006; but see Jelicic, Smeets, Candel, van Suijdam & Merckelbach, 
2006a), but these rates can be reduced by phrasing the misleading question in an 
unambiguous, rather than ambiguous manner (Smeets et al., 2006).  Yet, in almost every 
study to date, the participants have been residents of the country in which the focal event 
took place (the studies by Ost et al., 2006, and Wilson & French, 2006 are the only 
exceptions).  Therefore it becomes very difficult to tell whether the crashing memory 
effect occurs simply because there is something about certain people that leads them to 
generate ‘false memories’ or whether the effect occurs because participants are exposed 
to lots of media coverage concerning the events they are misled about.   
The explanation initially suggested by Crombag et al. (1996), and echoed by 
Jelicic et al. (2006b) is that the vivid and emotionally-charged nature of the events may 
lead participants to make a metacognitive error by combining the misleading suggestion 
that such footage exists with memories of footage (e.g. of the aftermath) that was shown 
on television, or pictures shown in media outlets (e.g. newspapers), and judging the 
resultant representation as a memory of the events that they did not, in fact, witness (see 
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Hyman & Loftus, 1997).  If this is the case then when participants have been exposed to a 
lot of footage of such events, they may be more likely to be misled about them (see 
Nourkova, Bernstein & Loftus, 2004).  Possibly, then, the crashing memories effect, 
could be explained with reference to the availability heuristic. 
According to the availability heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973) having seen 
similar footage may increase participants’ willingness to report seeing similar non-
existent footage because the repeated media coverage means that they are fairly easily 
able to retrieve information / images concerning that event1.  Catastrophic events 
typically result in a great deal of detailed discussion and analysis by media outlets in the 
country where the event occurred.  It is easy to see how this may lead to general 
information or images about that event being easier to retrieve for participants in that 
country (or with access to that media).  Our first hypothesis was that there would higher 
rates of false reporting in samples of participants who had been exposed to more 
television / media coverage of these events than samples of participants who have not.   
The next two aspects of the study addressed two enduring problems with many of 
the existing crashing memories studies.  The first problem is that we cannot be certain 
whether participants are truly remembering the events, or merely reporting that they 
believe the events to have occurred (Scoboria et al., 2004; Smeets et al., 2005; see also 
Ost, 2003).  Specifically, participants in the present study were asked whether they 
remembered whether the bus was moving or not.  This was included in order to try to 
differentiate those participants who seemed to genuinely have falsely ‘remembered’ the 
event (e.g. seemed to be ‘picturing’ the event) from those who merely ‘believed’ that they 
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had (e.g. answered ‘yes’, but provided no information that could not have been gained 
from other sources). 
The second, related, problem is that we cannot be sure that participants are truly 
remembering the false footage (i.e. developing a false ‘memory’) or whether they are 
instead making a source misattribution and confusing computerised reconstructions as 
being their personal memories of the events.  In the present study we explored this by 
including a condition in which participants were asked whether they had seen a (non-
existent) computerised reconstruction of the moment of the explosion.  Given that this 
comparison has not been made in previous research, we made no predictions about the 
likely rates of false reports in each condition. 
Finally, we investigated personality correlates of false reporting or false memory.  
A substantial body of work has found that participants who score highly on personality 
measures related to dissociation (Wright & Loftus, 1999) and fantasy proneness 
(Merckelbach, Horselenberg, & Muris, 2001) are more likely to make certain types of 
memory errors (Geraerts et al., 2005; Horselenberg et al., 2006; Ost et al., 2005; Wilson 
& French, 2006; Wright & Livingston-Raper, 2001; Wright & Osborne, 2005; but see 
Horselenberg, Merckelbach, van Breukelen, & Wessel, 2004).  
Method 
The target event  
The target event was the explosion on the number 30 bus in Tavistock Square, 
London on 7th July 2005.  This was the fourth and final explosion on the morning of 7th 
July and occurred at approximately 09:50 British Standard Time.  The three previous 
                                                                                                                                                                             
1
 Belli et al. (1998) for example found that participants who were able to retrieve four childhood memories 
rated their overall memorial abilities as better than participants who were asked to retrieve 12 childhood 
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explosions had occurred around 08:50 British Standard Time on trains just outside 
Liverpool Street and Edgeware Road stations, and on a train travelling between King’s 
Cross and Russell Square.  Shortly after the first three explosions occurred, television 
stations began covering the scenes showing survivors emerging from the underground 
stations.  The coverage continued throughout the day and the attacks were covered 
extensively as the lead news story for several days on the major news channels and in all 
the major newspapers in the UK.  It is highly likely that any resident of the UK would 
have seen at least some part of the television coverage.  These events were the lead news 
story on Swedish television on the 7th and 8th July, and continued to be the mentioned for 
the next few days, but not as the headline story. 
Design 
This experiment employed a 2 (Location: UK; Sweden) x 3 (Type of footage: 
aftermath; computerised reconstruction; closed circuit television) independent groups 
design.  Participants in the first condition were asked whether they remembered seeing 
the televised footage of the aftermath of the explosion of the number 30 bus in Tavistock 
Square on 7th July 2005.  Participants in the second condition were asked about their 
memory of having seen a computerised reconstruction of the explosion on television.  
Participants in the third condition were asked about their memory of having seen Closed 
Circuit Television (CCTV) footage of the actual moment of the explosion.  Neither 
CCTV footage, nor a computerised reconstruction, showing the moment of the explosion 
on the bus has ever been shown. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
events (a more difficult task). 
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Participants  
UK sample: 150 (non- Psychology) students were recruited at a University 
‘Fresher’s Fair’ event and systematically assigned to conditions (e.g. participant one 
completed condition one, participant two completed condition two etc.).  Three 
participants did not report their gender.  The rest of the sample consisted of 69 males and 
78 females, aged from 18 to 70 years (M = 20.54, SD = 5.46).  Participants were recruited 
by responding to a poster asking people to complete a questionnaire entitled “How well 
do you remember the television coverage of the London bombings?” in return for being 
entered into a draw to win various prizes (vouchers for a local music shop).  Participants 
who indicated that they had been personally involved, or knew someone who had been 
personally involved in the 7/7 attacks were not asked to complete the questionnaires, but 
their details were still entered into the prize draw.  The experiment was approved by the 
Psychology Department Research Ethics Committee. 
Swedish sample: 150 participants (non-Psychology) were recruited in university 
cafes, libraries and other social areas and systematically assigned to condition.  Seventeen 
participants did not report their gender and one did not report their age.  Of the remaining 
participants there were 46 males and 87 females, aged from 18 to 42 years (M=23.01, 
SD=3.59).  Participants took part in return for being entered into a draw to win various 
prizes (e.g. cinema tickets). 
Materials 
Three recall questionnaires were constructed.  The first section of the 
questionnaire asked for demographic information, including whether the participant had 
been resident in the country (UK or Sweden) for the last six months (questionnaires from 
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three UK participants and two Swedish participants were excluded for this reason).  The 
second section of the questionnaire was identical except that participants were asked 
about their memory of having seen either (i) the televised aftermath of the explosion of 
the number 30 bus in Tavistock Square on 7th July 2005, (ii) a computerised 
reconstruction of the explosion on television, or (iii) Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) 
footage of the actual moment of the explosion.  Participants were then asked to circle 
either Yes or No.  If they indicated ‘No’ then they were asked to skip ahead to a later 
section.  Participants who answered ‘Yes’ were asked to complete additional questions 
concerning their memory of the footage they had seen (adapted from Wilson & French, 
2006).  For the purposes of the present paper only three questions are directly relevant.  
These were “How certain are you that you have seen the [CCTV / Computerised 
reconstruction / Aftermath] footage?” (1 = very uncertain to 7 = very certain), and an 
open ended question which asked “Please briefly describe the sequence of events shown 
in the [CCTV footage / Computerised reconstruction / Aftermath footage]”.  Participants 
in the CCTV footage and computerised reconstruction were also asked “In the [CCTV 
footage / Computerised reconstruction], was the bus moving at the moment of the 
explosion?” (Yes, No, Can’t remember).  The recall questionnaires were straightforward 
to translate and any linguistic ambiguities were resolved by the authors via email prior to 
data collection.  Finally, all UK participants were also asked to complete the Dissociative 
Experiences Scale (DES-C; Wright & Loftus, 1999) and the Creative Experiences 
Questionnaire (CEQ; Merckelbach et al., 2001), presentation of which was 
counterbalanced2.  
                                                           
2
 These questionnaires were not distributed to the Swedish sample due to time constraints which precluded 
timely translation of the questionnaires from English. 
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Procedure   
These data were collected in both the UK and Sweden during a two week period 
at the beginning of October 2005, approximately 3 months after the events of 7th July 
2005.  The investigator explained the nature of the questionnaire, and the events that it 
pertained to.  If participants indicated that they had not been personally involved in the 
7th July events, then they were presented with a questionnaire pack consisting of the 
recall questionnaire (aftermath, reconstruction, or CCTV depending on condition) and, 
for the UK sample only, the individual differences measures, to complete at their own 
pace.  Once the questionnaires were completed, participants were thanked for their time 
and debriefed fully about the nature of the experiment.  Once the nature of the deception 
had been revealed to participants in the reconstruction and CCTV conditions, they were 
asked to sign a second informed consent form to indicate their consent for their data to be 
used.  
Results 
Differences in UK and Swedish samples 
The Swedish sample were significantly older (M=23.01 yrs, SD 3.50) than the UK 
sample (M=20.54 yrs, SD 5.46) (t295 = 4.59, p<.005) and comprised significantly more 
females than males in the Swedish sample (χ2 (1)=4.40, p<.05). However, there were no 
effects of gender on rates of false reporting in either the Swedish (t131=1.15, p>.05) or 
UK (t145=0.59, p>.05) samples.  Neither were there any correlations between age and 
false reporting for either the Swedish (Kendall’s tau_b = -.03, p>.05) or UK (Kendall’s 
tau_b = -.02, p>.05) samples.  
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Rates of false reports of having seen real and false footage - Sweden vs. UK 
The next analysis examined the number of participants in the Swedish sample, 
compared to the UK sample, who claimed to have seen either non-existent CCTV 
footage, a non-existent computerised reconstruction or the televised footage of the 
aftermath of the attack on the number 30 bus in Tavistock Square on 7th July 2005.  
Across both samples, participants were most likely to claim to have seen the aftermath 
footage (67%), followed by the non-existent CCTV footage (28%) and the non-existent 
computerised reconstruction (17%). 
As shown in Table 1, the type of footage participants claimed to have seen 
differed significantly as a function of their geographical location.  Forty percent of the 
UK sample claimed to have seen the non-existent CCTV footage, compared to 16% of 
the Swedish sample (χ2(1)=7.14, p<.01), 28% of the UK sample claimed to have seen a 
non-existent computerised reconstruction, compared to 6% of the Swedish sample 
(χ2(1)=8.57, p<.01), whilst 84% of the UK sample claimed to have seen any footage of 
the aftermath, compared to 50% of the Swedish sample (χ2(1)=13.07, p<.001).  
As also shown in Table 1, there was a main effect of geographical location on 
certainty judgments (F1, 106=9.54, p<.005) with Swedish participants reporting 
significantly less certainty that they had seen any of the types of footage (M=1.91, 
SD=0.90) than UK participants (M=2.85, SD=1.01).  Interestingly, there were no 
significant differences in participants’ certainty scores as a function of which type of 
footage they were asked about (F2, 106=2.85, n.s.).  The mean scores indicate that this lack 
of variation was unlikely to be due to floor or ceiling effects as the lowest mean certainty 
score (Swedish participants, reconstruction condition) was 3.66 (SD=2.51) on a seven 
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point scale, whereas the highest (UK participants, aftermath condition) was 6.23 
(SD=1.28). 
Distinguishing false ‘memories’ from false ‘reports’ 
The next analysis focussed on whether it was possible to distinguish participants 
who had just falsely reported seeing the event (i.e. who did not really ‘remember’ it), 
from those who genuinely seemed to have a false memory of the event.  Participants who 
claimed to have seen the non-existent footage were divided into two groups, based on 
their answers to a question about whether, in the footage they claimed to have seen, the 
bus was moving or not.  This first group, which stated that the bus definitely was or was 
not moving (they ticked a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ box in response to a question about whether or not 
the bus was moving at the moment of the explosion), were compared to participants who 
claimed that they could not remember this information (they ticked a ‘can’t remember’ 
box in answer to the same question).  The reason for this split was to attempt to 
categorise participants who genuinely thought they had seen the footage from those 
participants who claimed to have seen it yet could not provide any further information 
about the footage.  Of the 11 Swedish participants who claimed to have seen either the 
CCTV (n=8) or reconstruction (n=3), only 3 stated definitely that the bus was not moving 
(none claimed it was moving).  Of the 34 UK participants who claimed to have seen the 
CCTV (n=20) or reconstruction (n=14), 12 stated that the bus was (n=3), or was not 
(n=9), moving.   
Taking the base rates of exposure to media surrounding the events of 7th July into 
account allowed us to calculate (tentatively) that, in the Swedish sample (where the base 
rate of exposure was 50%) the rate of false reporting was 16% and the rate of false 
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‘memory’ was 6%.  Likewise, for the UK sample (where the base rate of exposure was 
84%) the false reporting rate was 29% and the false ‘memory’ rate was 12%.  This may 
indicate for the first time the ratio of ‘false reports’ to false ‘memory’ using the crashing 
memories paradigm.   
In order to investigate possible individual differences between participants who 
had a false memory of the footage, compared to those who made a false report, the 
analysis was run again but this time only including the 34 UK participants who had 
completed the personality questionnaires (the Swedish participants did not complete the 
individual differences measures).  There was a significant difference between the groups 
on both of the personality questionnaires.  Participants who made definite judgments 
about whether the bus was moving or not (n=12) scored significantly higher on the DES-
C (M = 46.93, SD = 14.37) than participants who reported that they did not know whether 
the bus was moving (n=22, M = 34.77, SD = 13.80) (t (32) = 1.78, p<.05, 1-tailed).  An 
effect in the same direction was found for participants’ scores on the Creative 
Experiences Scale with participants who claimed that the bus was, or was not, moving 
scoring significantly higher (M = 13.33, SD = 4.22) than participants who claimed that 
they did not remember (M = 10.54, SD = 4.40) (t (31) = 2.39, p<.05, 1-tailed).  As shown 
in Figure 1, the descriptions provided by these participants support the idea that these 
participants were making erroneous judgments of having seen the non-existent footage on 
the basis of a mental image of the sequence of events (i.e. a false ‘memory’).   
Discussion 
The present study replicated previous work showing that participants will claim to 
remember events that they were not exposed to (Crombag et al., 1996; Ost et al., 2002; 
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Granhag et al., 2003; Ost et al., 2006; Jelicic et al., 2006b; Smeets et al., 2006; Wilson & 
French, 2006).  More noteworthy are several important findings that extend our 
understanding of this kind of memory distortion. 
In the present study 40% of UK participants and 16% of Swedish participants 
claimed to have seen a central aspect of a real life traumatic event that they could not 
have witnessed.  A smaller percentage (28% UK and 6% Swedish) claimed to have seen a 
computerised reconstruction of the moment of the explosion.  The extent of false 
reporting was contingent on geographical location, with more UK participants (34%) in 
total claiming to have seen non-existent footage (CCTV + computerised reconstruction) 
than Swedish participants (11%).  In line with the availability heuristic (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1973) UK participants, who had been exposed to more media information 
about the attacks, were more prone to misremember a central detail such as having seen 
non-existent CCTV footage or a computerised reconstruction of the moment of the 
explosion.  This is the first time the effect has been demonstrated using the crashing 
memories method it would therefore be premature to conclude that the higher amounts of 
available information in the UK alone led to participants falsely reporting.  
We cannot, for example, rule out the possibility that the higher personal salience 
of these events for the UK sample may well have led them to seek out further sources of 
information concerning the attacks (the UK sample were more likely to have had 
relatives working in London at the time, for example).  The problem is that exposure and 
salience are likely to be highly positively correlated (the more salient an event is to you, 
the more likely you will be to seek information about it) which makes it difficult to 
analyse the effects of these two factors separately.   
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One possible way to examine this issue might be to find an event that was highly 
salient for a large number of individuals, some of whom had experienced more media 
exposure than others due to being in different geographical locations.  For example, 
Schuster et al. (2001) conducted a random telephone survey of 560 U.S. citizens in the 
days after the terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001. They found that the greatest 
stress reactions were reported by participants resident in New York at the time of the 
attacks but that substantial stress symptoms were reported by respondents from all across 
the U.S.  Following this line of thought, future studies might compare the memory errors 
of British nationals living abroad, participants resident in other areas of the UK and 
participants who were resident in London at the time of the attacks.  In this way the 
personal salience of the event might be held constant, whilst the geographical distance 
was varied.  It might even be possible to examine, with appropriate ethical safeguards, 
memory errors (or lack thereof) in participants who were directly caught up in the events 
of 7th July 2005 (see Thompson, Morton & Fraser, 1997; Yuille & Cutshall, 1986). 
False “memories” or false “reports”? 
A recent debate in the false memory literature has focused on whether memory 
errors or distortions produced following certain methodologies can indeed be said to 
represent false memories (DePrince et al., 2004; Ost, 2003; Pezdek & Lam, 2007; 
Scoboria et al., 2004; Smeets et al., 2005; Wade et al., 2007).  As noted by these authors, 
it is not always clear whether participants in some false memory studies actually 
‘remember’ a particular false event, or just ‘believe’ they have seen it (Smeets et al., 
2005; Scoboria et al., 2004; Ost, 2003; see also Tulving, 1989).  The present data 
provided a partial solution to this problem.  In the present experiment participants were 
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asked whether they remembered the bus moving at the time of the explosion (response 
options: ‘yes’, ‘no’, and ‘can’t remember’).  Participants’ responses to one closed 
question (which asked them whether or not the bus was moving at the time of the 
explosion) and a separate open-ended question (which asked them to describe the 
sequence of events in the non-existent CCTV footage) revealed that some participants 
reported having clear memories of the bus moving, and the subsequent explosion.  As 
they clearly cannot have experienced these events, it is reasonable to assume that these 
descriptions must be the result of a false memory mechanism (Hyman & Kleinknecht, 
1999; Hyman & Loftus, 1997).  It is worth stressing again that the explosion was a 
central feature of the event that these participants could not have witnessed.  
Interestingly, participants who claimed to have seen the bus moving, compared to those 
who did not, scored significantly higher on measures of dissociation and measures of 
fantasy proneness (although this is not entirely surprising, given that both measures are 
highly correlated; Merckelbach, Muris & Rassin, 1999).  This suggests that these 
particular false memories are indeed likely to be the product of imaginative processes or a 
deficit and/or failure in metacognitive monitoring (Crombag et al., 1996). 
It is important to note a number of caveats to our claims.  Firstly, participants who 
chose not to answer the question about the bus moving (e.g. who answered ‘don’t know’) 
may still have provided other (false) details of the CCTV if questioned further.  Thus, it is 
conceivable that participants we classified as not having a false ‘memory’ may indeed 
have developed a false ‘memory’ about other aspects of the event, or may have believed 
that they had seen the footage but could not recall any specific details.  They may also 
have incorrectly believed that the footage exists but that either did not see it, or did see it 
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but subsequently forgot about it.  It is also possible that this group consisted of 
participants who ‘complied’ with the initial question without ever believing the reality of 
the non-existent footage.  In order to examine this possibility, future research should 
attempt to elicit narratives from participants (as opposed to yes/no responses) to examine 
in more detail the extent, or lack, of their memory errors.  Whilst we attempted to gather 
narrative details in the present study (by asking participants to give a brief description of 
the sequence of events), gathering more extended narratives would enable more detailed 
analyses.  A second limitation is that we cannot rule out the possibility that some 
participants may already have believed that they had seen the non-existent footage before 
we suggested it to them.  Thus it is not clear whether it is the misleading question that is 
driving this effect.  One way this could be tested in the present methodology would be to 
pre-screen participants by eliciting a free narrative prior to any testing and then checking 
to see whether any false details were reported. 
Summary 
Our findings lend further support to the idea that it is relatively easy to mislead 
people to report incorrect central details concerning televised footage of highly charged 
public events.  We found that, overall, Swedish participants were less likely to be misled 
than UK participants, even when we took base rates of exposure into account.  Whether 
this is due primarily to increased exposure to images of the event from various media 
sources or due to other factors, such as the personal relevance of the event, remains an 
important question for future research. We were also able to suggest, for the first time, 
that the rate of false ‘memory’ was roughly a third that of the rate of false reporting.  
Finally, we are able to show that the people most ‘at risk’ of developing such false 
 18 
‘memories’ were those who scored higher on measures of dissociation and fantasy 
proneness.  This clearly has important implications for the treatment of individuals in 
extended, abuse-focused therapy and for the interviewing of witnesses to criminal events 
more generally. 
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Table 1. UK and Swedish participants who claimed to have seen each type of footage. 
 Number of participants who claimed to have seen each type of footage (yes/no) with certainty ratings (1-7) 
(percentage / standard deviation) 
 CCTV Reconstruction Aftermath 
 Yes Cert. No Cert. Yes Cert. No Cert. Yes Cert. No Cert. 
UK 
 
N=150 
20 
(40) 
4.80 
(1.90) 
30 
(60) 
--- 
 
n=50 
14 
(28) 
4.78 
(2.22) 
36 
(72) 
--- 
 
n=50 
42 
(84) 
6.23 
(1.28) 
8 (16) --- 
 
n=50 
Sweden 
 
N=150 
8 (16) 3.75 
(1.83) 
42 
(84) 
--- 
 
n=50 
3 (6) 3.66 
(2.51) 
47 
(94) 
--- 
 
n=50 
25 
(50) 
4.08 
(1.89) 
25 
(50) 
--- 
 
n=50 
 
Note: Cert. refers to participants’ ratings of “certainty” (1=very uncertain; 7=very certain). 
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Figure 1: Examples of participants’ responses to open ended statements about the 
sequence of events in the non-existent footage. 
 
 
“Bus appears to turn into Tavistock Square and people stand to get off and there is 
a flash and then nothing” (Participant 158). 
 
“The event was shown after a brief report.  The bus has stopped at a traffic light.  
There was a bight light and a loud bang and the top of the bus flew off and lots of 
screaming and then everything seemed still” (Participant 13). 
 
“Bus had just stopped to let people off when two women got on and a man.  He 
placed the bag by his side, the woman sat down and the doors closed, as the bus 
left there was the explosion and everyone started to scream while a leg was on the 
floor” (Participant 9). 
 
“The bus was moving slowly in traffic and then the back of the bus exploded.  A 
lot of debris everywhere and people panicking” (Participant 131). 
 
“Bus moving normally, then explosion, debris everywhere, chaos” (Participant 
24). 
 
 
 
